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Recently  Arthur  Burns,  Chairman  of  the  Board  of 
Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  reported 
to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Banking,  Housing,  and 
Urban  Affairs  on  the  condition  of  the  nation’s  bank- 
ing  system  [Z].  In  his  review  of  banking  conditions 
prominent  attention  was  given  to  capital  adequacy, 
over  which  concern  has  increased  in  recent  years. 
This  concern  centers  around  erosion  of  key  capital 
adequacy  ratios  and  has  been  heightened  due  to  the 
spread  of  banking  practices  that  entail  greater  risk 
(for  example,  liabilities  management)  and  to  prob- 
lems  with  loan  losses.  Fortunately,  Chairman  Burns 
was  able  to  report  that  the  capital  position  of  the 
banking  system  has  shown  improvement  over  the  past 
several  years. 
There  is no  guarantee,  however,  that  this  improve- 
ment  will  continue.  In  fact,  recent  increases  in 
capital/asset  ratios  are  partly  attributable  to  a  reces- 
sion-induced  slowing  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  bank 
assets.  A  return  to  the  rapid  asset  growth  that 
characterized  the  early  1970’s  is  likely  again  to  put 
downward  pressure  on  capital/asset  ratios.  Concern 
over  bank  capital  adequacy,  therefore,  is  likely  to 
continue. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  review  the  his- 
torical  trends  leading  to  the  present  day  capitalization 
of the  banking  system  and  to  provide  perspectives  on 
several  key  questions  surrounding  the  capital  ade- 
quacy  issue.  These  questions  concern  the  banking 
system’s  likely  future  capital  requirements  and  the 
ability  of  the  industry  to  meet  these  requirements. 
In  addition,  an  institutional  change  that  has  been 
proposed  as  a  solution  to  the  capital  adequacy  prob- 
lem  is  described  and  evaluated. 
Trends  in  Capital  Adequacy  Traditionally,  bank 
capital  adequacy  has  been  viewed  in  the  analytical 
context  of ratio  analysis.  Using  this  analytical  frame- 
work,  bank  capital  positions  are  evaluated  in  terms 
of  their  relationship  to  a  broad  balance  sheet  mea- 
sure,  commonly  total  deposits,  total  assets,  or  some 
special  combination  of  assets.  Evolutionary  changes 
in  the  banking  environment,  however,  introduce  a 
good  deal  of  relativism  into  ratio  analysis. 
Capital/Asset  Ratios  The  chart  plots  movements 
in two  ratios  that  have  been  widely  used  in evaluating 
modern  day  capital  adequacy.  These  are  equity  capi- 
tal  plus  reserves/total  assets  and  equity  capital  plus 
reserves/risk  assets.  For  reasons  to  be  discussed 
more  fully  below,  these  ratios  include  loss  reserves 
as  part  of  the  capital  base.  In  short,  reserves  and 
capital  work  together  in  providing  protection  against 
bank  failure. 
In  the  years  prior  to  World  War  II,  the  reguIatory 
authorities  relied  chiefly  on  the  ratio  of  capital/total 
assets  as an  analytical  tool  for  evaluating  bank  capital 
positions.  Starting  from  a  comfortable  12.2  percent 
in  1935, this  ratio  subsequently  declined  very  rapidly. 
This  decline  started  as  a  result  of  a  prewar  recovery 
in credit  demand  that  was  accompanied  by  only  very 
modest  increases  in  bank  capitalization.  The  decline 
in  the  capital/total  asset  ratio  became  even  more 
rapid  as  the  banking  system  acquired  huge  quantities 
of  U.  S.  Government  securities  issued  in  connection 
with  wartime  financing.  By  1945,  the  ratio  had 
fallen  to  5.5  percent  despite  large  additions  to  the 
equity  capital  base  that  were  inaugurated  starting  in 
the  early  1940’s.  Analysis  of  this  decline  by  con- 
cerned  bank  regulators  led  to  recognition  of  the 
differences  in  default  risk  among  different  types  of 
assets.  As  a  consequence,  a  new  ratio  for  evaluating 
capital  adequacy  came  into  use.  This  is  the  ratio  of 
capital  to  risk  assets,  the  denominator  being  defined 
as  total  assets  minus  those  assets  free  of  default  risk 
(cash  and  U.  S.  Government  securities). 
The  capital  to  risk  asset  ratio  has  become  one  of 
the  most  widely  used  analytical  measures  of  bank 
capital  adequacy.  Since  risk  assets  are  always  less 
than  total  assets,  the  capital/risk  asset  ratio  is  natu- 
rally  higher  than  the  capital/total  asset  ratio  for  any 
given  computational  period.  The  capital/risk  asset 
ratio  was  21.0  percent  in  1935  and  rose  to  a  peak  of 
26.7  percent  in  1944  as  bank  acquisitions  of  U.  S. 
Government  securities  during  the  war  years  acted  to 
increase  the  fraction  of risk-free  assets.  Conceptually, 
the  switch  by  Federal  bank  regulatory  agencies  from 
a  capital/total  asset  to  a  capital/risk  asset  approach 
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in  evaluating  bank  capital  positions  served  its  in- 
tended  function,  namely  to  provide  a capital  adequacy 
measure  that  would  not  penalize  banks  for  asset 
growth  directly  related  to  financing  of  the  war  effort. 
In  the  1950’s,  the  capital/risk  asset  ratio  declined 
at  a  moderate  rate,  from  18.0  percent  at  the  begin- 
ning  of  the  decade  to  15.5  percent  in  1959.  The 
capital/total  asset  ratio,  however,  increased  from  7.1 
percent  to  5.7  percent.  This  divergent  movement  of 
the  ratios  is explained  by  the  relative  rates  of  growth 
of  the  capital  base  and  the  various  types  of  bank 
assets.  The  capital/total  asset  ratio  clearly  indicates 
that  equity  growth,  which  resulted  almost  exclusively 
from  additions  to  retained  earnings,  exceeded  growth 
in  total  assets.  This  condition  is  generally  con- 
sidered  to  be  representative  of  strengthening  capital 
positions.  But  substitution  of  loans  and  other  in- 
vestments  for  holdings  of  U.  S.  Government  securi- 
ties  also  occurred,  resulting  in  a  rate  of  increase  in 
risk  assets  that  exceeded  the  rate  of  increase  in 
capital.  Taking  the  capital/total  asset  ratio  into 
account  along  with  the  capital/risk  asset  ratio  makes 
it clear  that  the  1950’s  was  a  period  of  strengthening 
in  the  banking  system’s  capital  position. 
In  the  early  1960’s,  the  capital/total  asset  ratio 
started  to  decline  aIong  with  the  capital/risk  asset 
ratio.  The  declines  were  the  result  of  accelerating 
rates  of  increase  in  risk  assets  and  total  assets  that 
outpaced  the  rate  of  increase  in  the  capital  base.  By 
1969  the  ratios  of  equity  capital  plus  reserves/risk 
assets  and  equity  capital  plus  reserves/total  assets 
had  dropped  to  11.3  percent  and  8.2  percent,  respec- 
tively.  By  1973  these  ratios  had  declined  to  9.3  per- 
cent  and  7.4  percent,  respectively.  From  the  early 
1%0’s  through  the  early  1970’s,  therefore,  the  bank- 
ing  system  clearly  suffered  a  decline  in  the  relation 
between  capital  and  assets. 
Senior  Debt  and Ratio  Analysis  Two  capital  ade- 
quacy  measures  that  include  senior  debt  (capital 
notes  and  debentures)  in  the  computation  of  the 
capital  base  are  also  plotted  on  the  chart  starting 
from  1960.  It  is  evident  that  senior  debt  has  been 
used  as  a  supplement  to  the  capital  base  to  a  signifi- 
cant  extent  since  the  mid-1960’s.  These  ratios  are 
important  because  they  represent  an  attempt  to  fore- 
stall,  or  at  least  to mitigate,  the  erosion  in the  capital/ 
risk  asset  and  capital/total  asset  ratios.  This  at.tempt 
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the  Currency  to  accept  Iimited  amounts  of  senior  debt 
in  substitution  for  additions  to  the  capital  base  of 
national  banks.  Actually,  some  analysts  contend  that 
senior  debt  should  be viewed  on  an  equal  footing  wirh 
equity  capital  and  reserves  and  that  the  most  relevant 
capital  adequacy  ratios  are  those  that  include  senior 
debt.  This  view  has  aIso  been  advocated  by  some 
bankers,  and  by  1976  senior  debt  grew  to  6.5  percent 
of  equity  capital  plus  reserves  for  aft  insured  com- 
mercial  banks.  The  pattern  of  utiiization  of  senior 
debt  across  the  banking  industry,  however,  has  been 
quite  uneven. 
A  study  of  the  extent  of  reliance  upon  senior  debt 
by  commercial  banks  {I]  has  shown  that  the  number 
of banks  issuing  notes  and  debentures  increased  from 
only  two  in  1961  to  635  by  mid-1972  Participation 
increased  steadily  in  the  1960’s  and  accelerated  in 
the  carry  1970’s.  Nevertheless,  the  635  banks  with 
notes  and  debentures  outstanding  in  mid-1972  repre- 
sented  only  4.7  percent  of  all  commercial.  banks. 
Initially,  state  chartered  banks  participated  in greater 
numbers  than  national  banks,  although  national  banks 
have  an  overwhelmingly  larger  dollar  volume  of  debt 
outstanding.  It  now  appears  that  national  banks  lead 
in  terms  of  both  namber  and  dollar  volume.  For  ail 
issuing  banks,  the  ratio  of  senior  debt  to  total  capital 
in  mid-1972  was  19.2  percent.  As  a  group,  banks 
issuing  notes  and  debentures  seem  to  place  a  fairly 
heavy  reliance  on  the  use  of  senior  debt  as  a  supple- 
ment  to  capital. 
Estimating  Future  Capital  Requirements  Esti- 
mating  the  future  capital  requirements  of  the  banking 
system  is  not  an  easy  task,  depending  as  it  does  on 
key  assumptions  that  contain  some  degree  of  uncer- 
tainty.  The  most  important  assumptions  are  those 
about  regulatory  policies  regarding  bank  capital  and 
the  likely  path  of  the  banking  system’s  asset  growth. 
These  will  be  considered  in  turn. 
Regzdutory  Policies  Regarding  Bunk  Capital  With 
respect  to  regulatory  policies,  it can  be safely  assumed 
that  the  current  degree  of  capitalization  of  the  bank- 
ing  system  represents  a  minimum  below  which  banks 
will  be  encouraged  not  to  fall.  From  the  chart  the 
current  degree  of  capitalization  in  terms  of  the  capi- 
tal/total  asset  ratio  lies  in  the  neighborhood  of  8 
percent.  Recent  regulatory  actions  taken  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  to  deny  applications  for  bank  hold- 
ing  company  expansion  because  of  concern  about  the 
capital  adequacy  of  bank  subsidiaries  provide  evi- 
dence  that  this  minimum  will  be  enforced. 
Future  ASS&  Growth  Forecasting  asset  growth 
is  a  particularly  difficult  task.  This  is  so  inasmuch 
as asset  growth  is itself  a  function  of  credit  demands 
and  the  amount  of  reserves  supplied  by  the  central 
bank.  One  approach  to  forecasting  asset  growth 
entaiis  working  with  possible  ranges  of  banking 
activity,  as  has  been  done  in a recent  study  by  George 
Hempel  [ 51.  In  this  study,  which  provides  one  of 
the  most  current  formal  estimates  of  capital  require- 
ments  available,  annually  compounded  asset  growth 
rates  ranging  from  2-16  percent  are  applied  to  fore- 
casting  periods  beginning  with  the  year  1975  and 
extending  to  1980 and  19S5,  Assuming  a  10 percent 
growth  rate  &rough  1980, which  falls  a bit  below  the 
11  percent  rate  of  the  1969-1975  pericdd;  aKd=  8----. 
percent  capitaiitotal  asset  ratio,  the  banking  system’s 
capital  base  would  be  required  to  expand  to  $125 
billion.  The  same  set  of  assumptions  extended  to 
1985  would  require  an  expansion  in  the  capital  base 
to  $201  billion.  These  two  estimates  can  be  com- 
pared  to the  $73  billion  of  equity  capital  plus  reserves 
held  by  the  bazking  system  in  1975 and  would  require 
additions  to  the  capital  base  of  $52  billion  and  $128 
billion,  respectively.  If  recent  experience  is  taken 
as  a  guide,  ir  may  prove  difficult  for  the  banking 
system  to  meet  rhese  capital  requirements. 
An  estimated  net  addition  to  capital  of  $52  billion 
over  the  period  1976-1980  would  require  average 
annual  increments  of  about  $10.4  billion.  In  con- 
trast,  average  annua1  additions  over  the  period  1969- 
1975  equaled  $5.9  billion.  These  additions  were 
below  the  amounts  necessary  to  prevent  declines  in 
the  key  capi’;ll/asset  ratios.  Excessive  reliance 
should  not  be  placed  on  the  details  of  this  compari- 
son,  since  the  estimate  of  future  needs  is based  on  an 
assumption  abortt  asset  growth  selected  from  a  broad 
range  of  possibilities.  The  comparative  figures  do, 
however,  illustrate  one  point  quite  vividly.  If  bank 
asset  expansion  is  to  progress  at  anywhere  near  the 
rate  of  the  eariy  1970’s,  then  enlarged  additions  to 
the  capital  base  will  be  necessary. 
Meeting  Future  Capital  Requirements  There  are 
two  basic  ways  for  banks  to  meet  their  capital  re- 
quirements,  namely  through  utilization  of  internal 
or  external  sources  of  funds.  Internal  funds  gener- 
ation  depends  on  profitability  and  earnings  retention, 
while  external  funds  generation  is  accomplished 
through  selling  stock  in  the  capital  markets. 
External  Generation  of  Cupidal  External  gener- 
ation  of capital  has,  unfortunately,  traditionaliy  posed 
difficulties  for  banks.  Price/earnings  ratios  on  bank 
stocks  commonly  run  below  10,  meaning  that  new 
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[7].  Quite  often,  therefore,  stock  issues  constitute 
an  expensive  form  of capital  generation  and  can  even 
contribute  to  further  declines  in  the  price/earnings 
ratio  by  diiuting  earnings  per  share.  Unless  market 
conditions  for  bank  stock  change  dramatically,  it 
appears  that  stock  issues  cannot  be  counted  on  to 
provide  a  major  part  of  estimated  future  capital  re- 
quirements  under  conditions  of  rapid  asset  growth. 
In  1976,  banks  generated  only  about  $350  million 
in  equity  capital.  This  contrasts  sharply  with  the 
roughly  $10.4  billion  total  annual  requirement  esti- 
mated  earlier. 
Internal  Generation  of  Capital  Internal  genera- 
-  -  ---  y-tion  of  capital,.-accomplished  by  making  after-tax 
additions  to  undivided  profits,  is  the  other  means  for 
increasing  stockholders  equity.  Also,  pre-tax  addi- 
tions  can  be  made  to  loss  reserves  on  the  basis  of 
historical  or  actual  loss  experience.  Additions  to 
undivided  profits,  or  retained  earnings,  offer  some 
discretion  to  banks,  being  a  function  not  only  of 
profitability  but  also  of  the  dividend  payout  rate. 
Dependable  earnings,  therefore,  will  play  an  ex- 
tremely  important  role  in  helping  fund  future  capital 
requirements.  This  is  especially  true  for  smaller 
banks,  which  typically  have  fewer  opportunities  for 
raising  external  capital  than  do  larger  banks  and 
necessarily  operate  with  lower  dividend  payout  rates. 
Larger  banking  organizations  that  operate  with  45-50 
percent  dividend  payout  rates  have  the  option  of 
making  reductions  in  the  rate  of  dividend  payout  in 
order  to  supplement  retained  earnings. 
Hempel  [5,  p.  181  estimates  that,  assuming  an 
earnings  growth  rate  of  8  percent  and  a  dividend 
payout  rate  of  40  percent,  earnings  retention  for  the 
banking  system  will  amount  to  $27  billion  by  1980 
and  $66  billion  by  1985.  Applying  these  estimates  to 
the  projected  annual  capital  requirement  for  the  1976- 
1980 period  of $10.4  billion  leaves  an  annual  external 
financing  requirement  of  $5.0  billion.  Again,  too 
much  emphasis  should  not  be  placed  on  the  details  of 
this  estimate.  However,  a  strong  suggestion  is given 
that  greater  reliance  may  have  to  be  placed  on  the 
capital  markets  in  the  future.  Some  more  recent 
estimates  of  external  financing  requirements  lie  in 
the  $2-3  billion  range  [4],  still  a  significant  amount 
by  historical  standards. 
Debt  As  A  Capital  Supplement  There  remains 
the  possibility,  advocated  by  some  analysts,  of  more 
intensive  use  of  senior  debt  as  a  supplement  to  the 
capital  base.  This  is  an  attractive  alternative  to 
banks  from  the  standpoint  of cost,  inasmuch  as  inter- 
est  payments  on  debt  are  tax  deductible  and  therefore 
have  a  tax  equivalent  cost  equal  to  only  about  half 
the  value  of  actual  dollar  interest  payments.  As  has 
already  been  mentioned,  some  banks  have  made  fairly 
extensive  use  of  senior  debt  as  an  alternative  to 
equity  capital. 
Both  equity  and  senior  debt  have  a  claim  on  bank 
assets  that  is  subordinate  to  the  claim  held  by  de- 
positors.  In  this  sense,  equity  and  debt  are  on  an 
equal  footing  in  offering  depositor  protection  should 
bank  failure  occur.  Such  protection  is  important,  of 
course,  because  of  the  risk  exposure  that  depositors 
bear.  Banks  are  unique  businesses  in  the  sense  that 
they  are  privately  owned  and  operated  and  yet  have  a 
special  fiduciary  relationship  with  depositors.  Given 
the  risks  inherent  in  the  banking  business,  which 
include  credit  and  liquidity  risks  in  addition  to  the 
normal  operating  risks,  not  only  shareholders  ‘but 
also  depositors  are  exposed  to  losses.  Before  the 
days  of  Federal  deposit  insurance,  bank  capital  played 
an  unambiguous  role  as  protection  for  the  depositor. 
Without  a central  insurance  fund,  the  bank  depositor 
was  forced  to  rely  on  his  personal  assessment  of  the 
stability  of  the  bank  holding  his  funds.  Individual 
bank  capital  positions  thus  meant  a  great  dea:l  in 
terms  of  reassuring  depositors  about  the  safety  of 
their  funds.  With  the  formation  of  the  FDIC  in 
1934,  however,  the  risk  of  loss  to  a  large  class  of 
depositors  was  virtually  e1iminated.l  From  the 
standpoint  of  the  average  depositor,  therefore,  bank 
capitalization  is  no  longer  the  determining  factor 
in  evaluating  deposit  safety.  Recognition  of  this  may 
have  actually  provided  banks  with  an  incentive  to 
reduce  their  capitalization,  there  no  longer  being  a 
cost  to  declining  capital  in  the  form  of  lost  deposits. 
One  line  of  thinking  attributes  the  sharply  lower 
capital  ratios  that  prevail  today  to  the  fact  that  FDIC 
insurance  now  performs  part  of  the  task  forrnerly 
done  by  bank  capital  [8]. 
There  is,  however,  an  important  sense  in  which 
equity  and  debt  are  not  equal,  namely  in  acting  to 
prevent  bank  failure  in  the  first  place.  In  the  event 
of  unusual  losses,  profits  can  be  reduced  to  zero,  and 
the  reserve  account  and  the  equity  account  are  avail- 
able  to  absorb  losses.  Interest  payments  on  debt, 
however,  may  not  be  reduced  as  part  of  the  manage- 
ment  response  to  such  circumstances.  1nteres.t  pay- 
ments  on  debt  represent  a  fixed  cost  to  the  bank 
over  the  life  of  the  debt.  Unusual  losses  that  iinhibit 
debt  payments  could  force  a  bank  into  liquidation. 
Furthermore,  debt  principal  does  not  perform  the 
primary  function  of  bank  capital  viz.,  standing  ready 
*Today,  over  60  percent  of  total  bank  deposits  are  insured  by  the 
FDIC. 
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insolvency.  It  is not  part  of the  pool  of  funds  against 
which  losses  can  be  charged.  Should  reserves  and 
capital  be  severely  reduced  or  exhausted  as  a  result 
of  losses,  a  bank  would  again  be  forced  into  liquida- 
tion  rather  than  continue  operations  on  a  senior  debt 
base.s 
Bank  regulators  are  concerned  with  protecting  the 
individual  depositor.  A  broader  aim,  however,  is 
protecting  the  banking  system,  and  by  extension  the 
entire  economy,  from  the  consequences  of  destabi- 
lizing  bank  failures  [9].  The  two  possible  conse- 
quences  of  bank  failures  that  have  serious  implica- 
tions  are:  (1)  the  creation  of  problems  for  otherwise 
healthy  banks  due  to  a  general  loss  of  confidence  in 
the  banking  system  by  uninsured  depositors  and  (2) 
the  creation  of large  fluctuations  in the  money  supply. 
Fulfillment  of this  broader  aim  means  containing  the 
size  and  extent  of  bank  failures,  Consequently,  bank 
regulators  must  necessarily  keep  the  inadequacies  of 
senior  debt  fully  in  mind.  As  part  of  their  effort  to 
achieve  the  aim  of  preventing  destabilizing  bank  fail- 
ures,  the  bank  regulatory  agencies  are  unlikely  to 
allow  any  substantial  liberalization  in  bank  use  of 
senior  debt  as  a  substitute  for  capital.  Rather,  as 
has  been  the  case  in  the  past,  moderate  amounts  of 
debt  may  be  permitted  for  use  by  banking  organiza- 
tions  that  have  already  demonstrated  the  capacity  to 
maintain  adequate  capital  positions. 
Until  March  of  1976,  the  instructions  followed  by 
commercial  banks  in  filling  out  reports  of  condition 
directed  that  capital  notes  and  debentures  be  listed 
with  equity  capital  on  the  liability  side  of  the  balance 
sheet.  The  revised  Consolidated  Report  of  Condi- 
tion,  first  used  for  the  March  31,  1976  call,  changes 
this  practice.  Xow,  subordinated  notes  and  deben- 
tures  are  listed  with  liabilities  and  not  with  equity 
capital.  This  reporting  change  formalizes  the  Federal 
regulatory  attitude  toward  debt,  namely  that  debt  is 
not  a  direct  capital  substitute. 
Asset  Discrimination  Should  the  banking  system 
find  itself  unable  to  match  expansion  in  assets  with 
at  ieast  proportionate  espansion  in  the  capital  ac- 
count,  the  only  alternative  is  reduction  of  asset 
growth.  If  emphasis  is  placed  on  elimination  of  the 
least  profitable  investment  alternatives,  asset  restric- 
tion  becomes  a  policy  of  “asset  discrimination”  [ 71. 
Several  large  banking  organizations  have  explicitly 
adopted  this  alternative  over  the  past  several  years, 
and  it  is likely  to  prove  necessary  on  a  selective  basis 
for  several  more  years  to  come.  Widespread  adop- 
z These  inadepuacies  of  senior  debt  are  discussed  in  detail  in  [llf  . 
tion  of  this  alternative  has  recognizably  serious  con- 
sequences  for  the  economy  in  general,  signifying  as 
it  does  a  reduction  in  a  major  source  of  credit  for 
firms  and  individuals.  It  is  also  possible,  however, 
that  a  policy  of  asset  discrimination  could  benefit  the 
long-run  position  of  the  banking  industry.  If  restric- 
tive  growth  policies  are  based  on asset  discrimination, 
profitability  could  be  improved,  thus  providing  the 
potential  for  additions  to  the  capital  base. 
Broadening  the  Scope  of  Deposit  Insurance  In 
the  current  institutional  setting,  bank  regulators  are 
faced  with  a  difficult  job  in  insuring  adequate  capi- 
talization  of  the  banking  system.  On  the  one  hand, 
they  must  be  concerned  about  containment  of  bank 
failures  and  protection  of  depositors’  interests.  On 
the  other,  they  must  take  care  not  to  be  overly  con- 
servative  and  thereby  limit  bank  credit  expansion  to 
an  unnecessary  degree.  Also,  there  is  no  direct 
procedure  for  bringing  banks  with  capital  positions 
judged  to  be  marginally  substandard  back  into  line. 
-4 fine  tuning  device  for  accomplishing  this  objective 
does  not  exist.  One  proposed  solution  to  these  prob- 
lems  involves  a  major  broadening  in  the  scope  of 
operations  of  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Cor- 
poration  [lo].  Basically,  FDIC  insurance  coverage 
would  be  extended  to  cover  all  deposits,  or  at  least 
a much  larger  share  of  deposits  than  is now  the  case, 
and  the  insurance  fee  schedule  would  be  revamped  to 
vary  with  individual  bank  risk  assessments. 
Comprehensive  deposit  insurance  coverage  would 
virtually  eliminate  liquidity  risks  arising  from  loss 
of  confidence  in  individual  banking  institutions.  Al- 
though  a  minority  of  deposits  are  currently  unin- 
sured,  these  deposits  include  large  amounts  of 
volatile  funds,  or  short-term  deposits  held  in  large 
accounts.  Loss  of  confidence  in  a  bank’s  stability 
might  cause  a  large  uninsured  depositor  to  shift  his 
funds  out  of the  bank,  resulting  in  a liquidity  squeeze 
and  possible  failure.  Such  problems  could  be  especi- 
ally  acute  for  nonmember  banks  who  lack  access  to 
the  Federal  Reserve’s  discount  window.  Compre- 
hensive  deposit  insurance  would  aIso  preserve  confi- 
dence  in  the  banking  system  in  the  event  of  individ- 
ual, but  serious,  bank  failures.  This  would,  of course, 
fulfill  one  of  the  primary  goals  of  the  regulatory 
agencies. 
The  costs  associated  with  comprehensive  FDIC 
insurance  coverage  have  recently  been  estimated  [6]. 
A  study  by  David  Humphrey  estimates  that  FDTC 
assessments  would  have  to  increase  by  only  1 percent 
to  maintain  the  current  insurance  fund/total  insured 
deposit  ratio.  A  cost  estimate  based  on  an  extremely 
conservative  estimate  of  future  losses  adds  only  10 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  7 percent  to  FDIC  assessments.  Since  the  effective 
FDIC  assessment  averaged  only  3.2  percent  of  in- 
sured  commercial  bank  net  income  from  1969-1974, 
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  costs  of  such  a 
program  could  be  absorbed  with  minimal  additional 
burden.” 
The  second  major  broadening  in  the  scope  of 
FDIC  operations,  namely  introduction  of  a  variable 
assessment  rate,  is  intended  to  introduce  greater 
regulatory  control  over  banks  with  deteriorating 
capital  positions.  Under  such  a  system,  banks  would 
be  charged  on  a  basis  that  fully  compensates  the 
insurance  fund  for  excessive  risk.  Bank  regulators 
could  quickly  respond  to  changes  in  risk  arising  from 
declining  capital/asset  ratios.  In  such  circumstances, 
the  insurance  fund  assessment  would  reduce  the 
degree  of concern  over  eroding  bank  capital  positions 
per  se. 
Establishment  of  a  variable  fee  structure,  subject 
to  periodic  review  and  revision,  could  also  pull  to- 
gether  an  evaluation  process  that  currently  differs 
among  regulators.  While  certainly  no  guarantee  that 
the  optimum  evaluation  system  would  be  developed, 
formal  adoption  of a variable  assessment  rate  plan  by 
the  FDIC  might  nevertheless  provide  impetus  for 
development  of  such  a  system.  The  idea  of  leveling 
varying  assessments  on  insured  banks  depending  on 
their  risk  evaluations  is  inherently  equitable,  too. 
It  penalizes  offending  banks  with  higher  assessments 
and  rewards  prudent  banks  with  lower  assessments. 
Conclusion  It  seems  fairly  clear  that  future  ex- 
pansion  in  bank  assets  must  be  at  least  matched  by  a 
proportionate  expansion  in  capital.  Trends  in  key 
capital/asset  ratios  reached  historical  lows  in  the 
period  1973-1974.  Bank  regulators  are  unlikely  to 
tolerate  such  low  ratios  again.  At  the  same  time, 
traditional  problems  with  generation  of  capital  per- 
sist,  and  expanded  use  of  debt  as  a  capital  supple- 
ment  is clearly  not  a favored  solution  from  the  regu- 
latory  standpoint.  Call  report  revisions  effected  last 
year  removing  subordinated  debt  from  the  capital 
account  and  grouping  it  with  other  liabilities  empha- 
size  the  restrictive  regulatory  attitude  toward  this 
item. 
These  conditions  suggest  that  asset  discrimination, 
i.e.,  a  policy  designed  to  moderate  total  asset  growth 
while  emphasizing  higher  earning  uses  of  funds,  may 
be  a  realistic  possibility  in  the  years  ahead.  An  ex- 
3The  effective  assessment  ratio  in  1976  was  l/27  of  1  percent  of 
assessable assets.  The actual  annual  assessment  is  l/12  of  1 percent. 
but  this  is  reduced  by  a  66-Z/3  percent  credit  applied  to  the  gmss 
assessments  due  from  banks  after  deducting  administrative  and 
operating  costs.  insurance  losses.  and  additions  to  the  Ioss  reserve. 
For  a  fuller  explanation  see  [3,  p.  211. 
pansion  in  the  scope  of  FDIC  operations  to  include 
comprehensive  deposit  insurance  coverage  and  a 
variable  insurance  fee  schedule  is  one  possibility  for 
easing  concern  over  the  capital  adequacy  problem. 
According  to  this  possibility,  banks  would  no  longer 
be admonished  to  maintain  certain  minimum  capital/ 
asset  ratios.  Rather,  the  FDIC  would  require  insur- 
ance  payments  tied  to  the  degree  of  risk  with  which 
banks  operate.  Under  such  a  system,  insurance 
payments  would  increase  to  whatever  level  was 
necessary  to  compensate  for  declining  capital.  Such 
an  institutional  change  might  mitigate  the  effects  of a 
growth  restriction  on  bank  assets. 
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